Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) are widely used in many areas, such as industrial, commercial and public-safety environments. However, due to the open nature of wireless communication, it is relatively easy for an adversary to launch serious wormhole attack which can't be even prevented by cryptographic protocols. To enhance the efficiency and facility of wormhole detection, we here propose a high efficiency wormhole detection algorithm based on 2-hop neighbor in WMNs, which is called Wormhole Detection based on Neighbor's Neighbor scheme (WDNN). Then a simple Random Walk Route scheme (RWR) is proposed to prevent routes from wormholes, which attract traffic of the routing protocols based on least cost. In WDNN, through enlarging the transmission range of the 2-hop neighbor, the faked network topology resulted by wormholes can be detected without using extra hardware or clock synchronization. In RWR, the route is chosen without using the low latency link which is created by wormholes. Security analysis shows that the wormhole attacks can be detected and also be prevented using our schemes efficiently. And our simulation results also indicate that our schemes can obtain a 100% wormhole detection rate and prevent routes from being attacked by the adversary against traditional routing protocols.
Introduction
A Wireless Mesh Network (WMN) is self-organized and self-configured dynamically, and the nodes in the network establish an ad hoc network automatically while maintaining the mesh connectivity as well [1] , [2] . The open nature of wireless and multi-hop makes security vulnerabilities become crucial problems in WMNs, it is easily exposed to a variety of attacks such as node compromising, wormhole attack, physical disruption, etc.
The security issue is an important aspect of monitoring application in WMNs. And due to the character of multi-hop routing in WMNs, it is prone to various types of Denials of Service (DoS) In this paper, the wormhole attack in WMNs is taken into consideration. We focus on detecting the wormhole attack and also the prevention of wormhole attack in WMNs. However, the detection and prevention of wormhole attack are complicated by the network scale, mobility, the highly constrained system resources, and etc. In wormhole attack, the adversary connects two distant points in the network using a direct low-latency link which is called the wormhole link [4] . Moreover, the wormhole link can be established by various means, e. g., by using a network cable and any form of "wired" link technology or a long-range wireless transmission in a different band. Once the wormhole link is established, the two colluding malicious nodes begin to launch wormhole attack. The adversary eavesdrops messages at one end of the link and relays messages at the other end of the link. Thus, nodes choose to transmit messages through this wormhole link since this route needs fewer hops to destination than normal routes. During this period, the wormhole nodes can launch other kinds of attacks, such as selective forwarding attack, black hole attack, etc. An example is given in Fig. 1 [4] , [5] . Here W1 and W2 are the two wormhole nodes, and other nodes are normal nodes in WMNs, like node a, b and c. The neighbors of W1 and neighbors of W2 become neighbors of each other via the wormhole link created by W1 and W2. Thus, in Fig. 1 , node a and c are neighbors when the network topology is initialized and messages from node b must traverse multi-hops to reach a and c. However, after the wormhole is deployed by the adversary, b becomes a 1-hop neighbor of both a and c, and vice versa. If the wormhole is placed carefully by the attacker and is long enough, the wormhole link can attract lots of routes. Note that if the wormhole link is short, it may not attract much traffic, and hence will not do much damage to the network. Thus, in this paper we only consider the wormhole attacks that the wormhole links are long enough so that it is worthy to the adversary.
In this paper, WDNN and RWR are proposed to detect and prevent the wormhole attack without using extra hardware or clock synchronization. When the network suffers from wormhole attack, the network topology is disrupted badly due to the wormhole link. Then by using WDNN scheme, the wormhole can be detected by checking whether there exists a faked topology that can only appear in network with wormhole links. To detect the faked topology, the 2-hop neighbor (neighbor's neighbor) is used and its transmission radius is doubled. Then each pair neighbor nodes execute WDNN so that all the wormholes in the network can be detected. In RWR, the next hop of current node is chosen randomly without being disrupted by wormhole link. As each node has several neighbor nodes, the packets only have small possibility to choose the node affected by wormhole attack as next hop. And the more neighbors each node has, the smaller the wormhole attack's damage is. And also the longer distance (denoted by hops) between the wormhole node and the source, the smaller damage is caused by the wormhole attack as proved in Section 5. Moreover, the wormhole attack is detected in WDNN. To further prevent the network from wormhole attacks, the detection results can be used for routing away from wormhole nodes. In detail, the random walk scheme is restricted that the packets don't choose the node near the wormhole node area as next hop. Using this strategy, the network can be protected better.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, related work is discussed. In Section 3, the models and assumptions are presented. In Section 4, the schemes of detecting and preventing the wormhole attacks are proposed. Security analysis is given in Section 5. In Section 6, the performance of our scheme is evaluated by simulations. Finally, we conclude and discuss future work in Section 7.
Related Work
Based on the principle of detection mechanism, the existing techniques of detecting and preventing wormhole attacks can be classified into five types [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] , clock synchronization, hardware-used methods, statistical analysis, neighbor-related methods and key-based methods.
Clock Synchronization
Several of the proposals need tight clock synchronization which is difficult to obtain in WMNs. In [6] , Hu, et al. use the packet leashes to detect wormhole attacks. A leash is the information that is added to a packet and designed to restrict the packet maximum allowed transmission distance. Geographical or temporal information is contained in the packet leashes to bound the distance or the lifetime of an end-to-end transmitted packet. When a sender delivers packets, a domain in the packet contains geographical leash or temporal leash. A receiver checks if it's out of bound. However, GPS must be used to acquire geographical information and tight clock synchronization are needed for temporal information.
The Delay Per Hop Indication (DelPHI) [7] , Wormhole Attack Prevention (WAP) [8] and Transmission Time-based Mechanism (TTM) [9] do not required hardware and are based on the premise that a route with a small Hop Counts (HC) will have a small Round Trip Time (RTT) measure. If the RTT per HC of a specific route is higher than a pre-calculated threshold, the route is considered to be a wormhole route. And in [10] , a new packet-based Traversal Time and Hop Count Analysis (TTHCA) wormhole detection algorithm, designed as an extension to the AODV routing protocol, combines some of the latent benefits of RTT-based techniques with HC analysis. Obviously, these approaches also need synchronized clocks.
Hardware-used Methods
To overcome the constraints of clock synchronization methods, in [11] Capkun, et al. propose the MAD (Mutual Authenticated Distance-bounding) protocol which is similar to packet leashes but based on the concept of distance-bounding without using synchronized clocks or GPS. In this approach, a node has to instantaneously respond to a series of bit exchanges sent by a second node who computes the distance between them using timing properties. However, it has enormous computing consumption which is not suitable for WMNs, and it also needs special hardware to switch the node mode between sending and receiving.
In [12] , the Echo protocol is proposed, in which ultrasound is used to bound the distance for the secure location verification. Using the ultrasound instead of RF signals helps in relaxing the timing requirements, but it needs an extra hardware. Poovendran, et al. [13] use only several nodes equipped with GPS and higher transmission range R which are called anchors randomly deployed in the network. So two nodes are neighbors if and only if they hear each other and they hear more than T common anchors. Two rules are used to detect a wormhole attack: a node should not receive the same message from the same anchor and should not hear two anchors that are 2R apart from each other.
The First End-to-End Protocol to secure ad hoc networks with Variable Range (FEEPVR) [14] and Simple and Efficient End-to-End Protocol (SEEEP) [15] use the geographical information to achieve the goal of detecting wormholes. So each node requires extra positioning device.
Statistical Analysis
In [16] [17], a statistical analysis for detecting wormhole attacks is proposed, called Statistical Analysis of Multi-path (SAM). They mainly consider the frequency of each link appearing in all the routes. Namely, if a link appears frequently, then the link has a high possibility of being attacked, and vice versa. Based on the fact that link frequency is almost the same in normal network while link frequency has a big gap among different links under wormhole attack, the malicious node can be identified. Song's method requires neither clock synchronization nor additional hardware, which allows for easy integration of this method into intrusion detection system. Some other schemes use Neighbor Number Test (NNT) and All Distance Test (ADT) [18] to detect wormhole attacks. Both mechanisms assume that the sensors send their neighbor list to the base station, and the base station runs the algorithms on the network graph that is reconstructed from the received neighborhood information. But the wormhole can only be detected after a fraction of the network has been compromised.
Neighbor-related Methods
We define the methods that involves with neighbor information as neighbor-related methods. In [19] , a method that uses directional antennas to detect wormhole attacks is proposed. Each node gets approximate direction information based on received signals. And each node maintains a neighbor list using a protocol called neighbor discovery. As directional information is added, attacks become increasingly difficult to execute successfully. In [20] , Wang, et al. proposed the Multi-dimensional Scaling (MDS) algorithm which builds a virtual layout of the network. This method is similar to localization of the network nodes in a metric space. The layout should be relatively flat without any wormhole. But the layout could be warped in presence of wormholes. The technique is purely centralized and is considerably susceptible to distance estimation errors.
The authors of [4] proposed an algorithm that only uses connectivity information to look for forbidden substructures in the connectivity graph. This approach is completely localized and does not use hardware or location information, which makes it universally applicable. In [5] Znaidi, et al. proposed another algorithm that uses only local and neighborhood information without requiring clock synchronization, location information or dedicated hardware. And the neighborhood information is assumed to be collected by various upper layer neighbor discovery protocols. However, this detection algorithm essentially looks at local structures whether there is a wormhole or not.
A Lightweight Countermeasure for the Wormhole Attack in Multi-hop Wireless Networks (LITEWORP) is proposed by Khalil, et al. [21] . LITEWORP uses secure two-hop neighbor discovery and local monitoring of control traffic to detect nodes involved in the wormhole attack. It provides a countermeasure that isolates the wormhole nodes from the network therefore removing their ability to cause future damage. LITEWORP has various features that make it especially suitable for resource-constrained wireless environments, sensor networks for example.
Detecting Wormhole Attack in Delay-Tolerant Networks [22] develops a simple, yet effective, wormhole attack detection mechanism in which nodes reduce their transmission range for a short period of time to check for the existence of any forbidden topology in a network to determine the existence of the wormhole attacks. Forbidden topology, as the foundation of this mechanism, is to examine the network topology by exploiting the geometric relationship of nodes' locations under the constraint of the transmission range of a node.
Key-based Methods
Another possible solution to detect wormhole attacks is proposed in [23] , which is based on key. And [13] depending on location-based keys, a node-to-node authentication scheme can localize the impact of compromised nodes within their vicinity and facilitate the establishment of pairwise keys between neighboring nodes. These schemes only accept messages from authenticated neighbors and discard those messages tunneled from multi-hop-away locations thus preventing the wormhole attack. In [24] , Sharma et al. present a mechanism which uses the verification of digital signatures of sending nodes by receiving node, because each legitimate node in the network contains the digital signature of every other legitimate nodes of the same network. In the solution, if a sender wants to send the message to the destination, firstly it creates a secure path between sender and receiver with the help of verification of digital signature. Any malicious node on the path can be identified because malicious node does not have its own legal digital signature.
Models and Assumptions
In this Section, we describe the models of the network and attack. And some assumptions are also given below.
Network Model
The network is assumed to consist of a large number of nodes, which are randomly deployed in a region. Each node can establish links to their neighbors when the distance between them is less equal than the transmission radius r. For any node, s for example, the set of neighbors is denoted by N(s). The first assumption below is related to the neighbor discovery and is denoted by Network Model Assumption, namely NMA-1.
NMA-1
Two types of nodes are considered in the network, normal nodes and malicious nodes, as we call wormhole nodes in this paper. The normal nodes include the routers and terminals in WMNs, while the wormhole nodes are deployed by the adversary or through other ways. The differences between normal nodes and wormhole nodes lie in the aspects of transmission range, power, frequency band, etc. And each node does not need to know other nodes' specific locations, namely, no GPS is required for any node.
Attack Model
As described in Section 1, during the wormhole attack, one wormhole node sniffs packets at one point in the network, tunnels them through the wormhole link to the other point. The adversary just places some malicious nodes instead of compromising legitimate nodes or their cryptographic keys. Thus the wormhole attacks cannot acquire the content of the packets. In this paper, only wormhole with two end points far from each other is considered. Therefore, we have the following Attack Model Assumption, namely AMA.
AMA-1
In this paper, we only consider the wormhole attacks that the wormhole link is long enough so that regions A and B are well separated from each other [25] . Thus it makes no sense to have overlapping wormhole endpoints or endpoints close to each other.
And not all time the network is being attacked. Then we have the AMA-2 [25] .
AMA-2
There is some initial interval t 0 where no attack has happened and nodes have safely established their neighbors.
This assumption gives the information that some time is needed to ensure the nodes deployment and neighbors acquired which is necessary in our work. And in [20] , wormhole attacks are categorized as open, half-open and closed. In this paper, we mainly consider the closed wormhole that both the two wormhole nodes participate in the attack process.
Wormhole Detection Based on Neighbor's Neighbor and Random Walk Route
The network is vulnerable when the packets are transmitted from source to destination since wormhole attacks can impact the transmission. Thus, we propose the detection scheme WDNN to detect the wormhole attacks. And the prevention scheme RWR is also presented to prevent the network routing from wormhole attacks. First, we give the following definitions.
Definition-1
If two neighbor nodes have at least one same neighbor, we say the two neighbor nodes have the same neighbor. And the same neighbor is called s-neighbor. b is node a's neighbor, and b to c's hops is shorter than a to c's when c  is the destination, we say b is a's nearer neighbor, called n-neighbor. Otherwise, b is a's farther  neighbor, called f-neighbor. 
Definition-2 If node

WDNN Scheme
In normal case, where no wormhole attacks exist in the network, if two nodes have a s-neighbor, one f-neighbor of s-neighbor to the two nodes expands its transmission radius two times as before, then the two nodes should be in the neighbor list of the s-neighbor. We present an example in Thence, we propose the detection scheme based on the analysis above. Before transmitting packets, each two neighbor nodes pair of the network uses the technique described above to detect whether there exists wormhole link. After calculating by all the two neighbors, all the wormhole links can be detected.
RWR Scheme
As the typical feature of wormhole attack is that it can make other nodes believe that the path through the wormhole nodes is the shortest path. Therefore routing protocols based on least cost, such as AODV, LS will suffer badly. Based on this idea, the RWR scheme is proposed, in which packets don't definitely choose the route with the smallest hops. Thus, the low-latency link created by the wormhole is ignored by RWR. As a result, the network is not influenced by the temping routes established by wormholes, which can reduce the wormhole's bad consequence enormously at the cost of some performance. The specific scheme is: (1) Each node acquires its neighbor list during the neighbor discovery process. (2) The node that receives the packet randomly selects a node as the next hop in its neighbor list. If the wormhole node is selected as the next hop, then the packet is captured. Otherwise, the packet is safe. (3) The shortest hop count from source to destination can be acquired using the Dijkstra Algorithm, which is denoted by s-count. And a domain, which records the hop counts from source to destination, is carried by each packet. If the count in this domain equals s-count, the packet should be dropped. Otherwise, the packet can be accepted.
In Fig. 4 , an example is given, where S1, S2 are sources, and D1, D2 are destinations respectively. S1 transmits packets through the shortest path to D1, while S2 uses random walk scheme to transfer packets to D2. As random walk randomly selects the next hop, there is a small probability that the packet is captured. Moreover, the network can be protected better using s-count against wormhole attacks. And the analysis of the probability is discussed in Section 5. 
Security Analysis
In this paper, a wormhole detection scheme WDNN and a wormhole prevention scheme RWR are proposed. After the wormhole attack is detected, the RWR is used to prevent it from disturbing routing messages. Accordingly, security analysis is given respectively in this section. To describe our scheme clearly, the symbols used in this section are listed in Table 2 . To facilitate the verification of the feasibility of WDNN, the relationship between p and R is researched. We assume an application scenario in which a set of n nodes are deployed in a square region with side length a. And d avg is defined to represent the average distance between two neighbors, and d avg is calculated as follows.
As the nodes are uniform distributed, it is equivalent to an ideal situation that the distance between two neighbors is the same, namely d avg . The ideal model is shown in Fig. 5 . We assume each row distributes r or (r-1 ) nodes, and c column totally. Then c must be odd number based on this model because the number of rows with r nodes is one more than rows with (r-1 ) nodes.
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Fig. 5: Uniform distribution model
The total number of nodes is n, then we can get (r-1)*(c-1)/2+r*((c-1)/2+1)=n. The side length is a, and we can get (r-1)*d avg =a easily; finally, we can get (a/(c − 1))
based on the Pythagorean Theorem. Thence, we have the following equations:
n Both the value of a and n are known, thence we can get d avg . R is related to d avg and p. Obviously, we can draw the conclusion that if R ≤ d avg , two neighbors can have s-neighbor, namely p = 1.
From Section 4, we get the Theorem-1.
Theorem-1
The node that expands its transmission radius has the neighbor list containing at least one of the two neighbor nodes.
Proof: As in Fig. 6 , the distance between node a and c is d 1 , the distance between c and d is d 2 , while d 3 is the distance between a and d, the transmission radius is R at the beginning. Then, the feasibility of RWR scheme is discussed. We utilize the random walk scheme to transfer packets, the n-neighbor or the f-neighbor may be selected as the next hop at each node. Here, we assume the n-neighbor and the f-neighbor have the same probability to be chosen as the next hop. And the hops between the source and a wormhole node are denoted by d sw , which is related to the probability P attack that a packet is captured. The relationship is as follow:
where N nei is the average number of a node's neighbors. Two examples are shown in Fig. 7 based on the uniform distribution model. S1, S2 are sources; D1, D2 are destinations for S1, S2 respectively; W1, W2, W3 and W4 are wormhole nodes, and W1, W2 form a wormhole pair, W3, W4 form another. In Fig. 7 (a) , S1 and D1 are the source and destination respectively, W1 and W2 are invading the network. The probability that a packet from S1 being captured is 1 6 . Because 6 nodes are in S1 's neighbor list, and S1 is one hop away from W1. Thence, S1 selects W1 as the next hop with the probability of 1 6 . In Fig. 7 (b) , the probability that a packet from S2 being captured is
2 . For S2 selects N1 as the next hop with the probability of 1 6 , N2 is chosen as the next hop with the probability of 1 5 , the probability that N2 chooses W3 as the next hop is also 1 5 . And we don't consider the condition that N1 selects S2 as the next hop which is also not real in networks. Thus, the total probability is
(b) Fig. 7 : Random walk probability
Simulation Results
In order to verify the performance of our wormhole detection and prevention algorithms, different simulation experiments have been carried out. In the experiments, source nodes and destination nodes are assumed to be safe enough which can't be compromised. Other nodes in the WMN are gradually captured randomly and turned into malicious node pairs which are used to launch the wormhole attack later by the adversary. All nodes in the formed network are distributed randomly which form a unit disk graph for universality. To validate the effectiveness of our algorithm and the high effect of wormhole position on network corruption, the algorithm is evaluated with two different wormhole distributions: i) Random distribution among the whole network and ii) Wormholes placed between source nodes and destination nodes.
The simulation is performed for a network consisted of 100 nodes which are distributed in a square. The transmission range of each node is 5 which means two nodes with distance less equal than 5 away from each other can establish a link. The source nodes and destination nodes consist of 10 nodes separately which are selected randomly in the network. In order to ensure the accuracy of algorithm and prevent accidental error form affecting the result, experiments are carried out five times for the network with the same number of wormholes and the average value is taken as the final result. position of wormholes is random. As shown in Fig. 8 , after the nodes are turned into malicious nodes, at most 30% of all the 100 routes are compromised due to the captured nodes. Then the wormhole nodes begin to make pairs and launch the wormhole attack. As expected, the fraction of routes compromised due to the wormhole attack increases rapidly. More than 60% of all the routes are compromised at average which indicates that the whole network is nearly corrupted. Only some routes which are far away from the wormholes can survive the wormhole attack. In Fig. 9 , since our Random Walk algorithm can avoid the routes which can provide fewer hops to some extent, the wormholes have no real effect on our choosing which route to transmit messages. the position of wormholes is set in the middle of source nodes and destination nodes. As shown in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 , nearly 100% of the routes in the network are compromised due to the wormholes. The wormholes are placed just in the middle of the network so that nearly all routes can have fewer hops with wormholes on them. These serious results further prove that if the wormholes are placed by the adversary in some fixed good position, the network will be completely destroyed. Since the favorable position of the wormholes, nearly 60% of the network is compromised even before the wormhole attack in the Least Cost Route. However, in Fig. 11 , the position of wormholes has little effect on Random Walk Route in which 30% of all the routes are compromised on average. And moreover, in the Least Cost Route, the faction of compromised routes increases greatly as the number of wormholes increases. In the Random Walk Route, however, the fraction of compromised routes increases slightly. To sum up, the Random Walk Route is more robust and immune to wormhole attack, compared with the Least Cost Route. Fig. 12 presents the wormhole detection rate in network with wormholes selected randomly and Fig. 13 presents the wormhole detection rate in network with wormholes placed in the middle of source nodes and destination nodes. It can be seen from Fig. 12 and Fig. 13 that the wormhole detection rate of our detection algorithm is nearly 100% and has nothing to do with the position of wormholes. In Fig. 12 and Fig. 13 , occasionally, the wormholes can't be detected. In this situation, the wormhole is far away from the routes and even may be some isolated nodes or the two ends of the wormholes is very nearby, such as one-hop wormhole. These wormholes, however, will have no bad effect on the network and can be ignored. Our detection algorithm needs only local neighborhood information so that just bacon messages are enough. So the detection works before real messages traverse through the routes which can reduce the damage to the network further. The source nodes can choose other routes after the detection of wormholes. 
Conclusion
In this paper, a wormhole attack detection scheme WDNN and a prevention scheme RWR in WMNs are proposed. Through WDNN, the wormhole is detected with a high rate, and the network can avoid the normal routes attracted by the wormhole link with high efficiency by RWR. In WDNN, first two neighbor nodes have certainly a same neighbor by our theorem proof. Then the farther neighbor of this 1-hop neighbor is defined as a key node. Through adjusting the transmission range of this key node, the faked topology created by the wormhole can be detected. The simulation results indicate that the wormhole detection rate is 100% with no extra hardware or clock synchronization. Moreover, the fraction of compromised routes falls quickly with our RWR scheme. To sum up, our scheme can provide high efficiency with few resource consumption. And how to improve the performance of routing protocols of preventing the wormhole attack with
